Civil Code and Related Subjects: Property by Dainow, Joseph
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 20 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1958-1959 Term
February 1960
Civil Code and Related Subjects: Property
Joseph Dainow
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Joseph Dainow, Civil Code and Related Subjects: Property, 20 La. L. Rev. (1960)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol20/iss2/4
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
for the maintenance and support of the dependent. But can one
be considered justified in voluntarily decreasing his income (or
assuming additional obligations) if his alimony payments are
not:sufficient to support the dependent? To maintain the af-
firmative would be to deny the obligation itself. Thus the de-
cision, in the writer's opinion, should be taken to mean that one
may not obtain the reduction of his alimentary obligations be-
yond the point of adequacy for the dependent by voluntarily re-
ducing his ability to pay.
The decision in White v. Morris,16 however, is one with which
the writer cannot. agree. There it was declared that an alimony
award in favor of children made in a judgment of separation
was cancelled by a judgment of divorce between these parents
which simply made no provision for alimony. The writer ex-
pressed his views on this subject in reviewing a similar case de-
cided three years ago and they need not be repeated here. 7
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
In Roy v. Board of Commissioners' a claim was made for
property on Lake Pontchartrain which had been appropriated
for levee purposes. The private ownership interests and limita-
tions in riparian property depend primarily on the legal classi-
fication of the adjacent or superjacent body of water (i.e., river,
lake, sea, etc.; navigable or non-navigable). While the immediate
case resulted in a remand for further facts essential to final
determination, the court made the statement: "It is immaterial
whether the property be classified as sea shore, which, being
common property, belongs to no one in particular and is insus-
ceptible of private ownership, or as the bed of a navigable lake,
ownership to which is vested in the state up to the high-water
mark, since in either event plaintiff would not be entitled to
compensation. ' '2
There have been conflicting opinions concerning the classi-
16. 236 La. 767, 109 So.2d 87 (1959).
17. See the writer's remarks on the decision in Thornton v. Floyd, 229 La.
237, 85 So.2d 499 (1956), in 17 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 311-13 (1957).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 237 La. 541, 111 So.2d 765 (1959).
2. Id. at 550, 111 So.2d at 768 (court's footnotes omitted).
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fication of Lake Pontchartrain, and some of the. stronger de-
cisions classify it as an arm of the sea thereby making the land
at the water's edge "sea shore. ' 3 Even though it would make no
difference to the plaintiff in a particular case, the above lan-
guage of the court would tend to accentuate confusion concerning
the legal classification of Lake Pontchartrain. It would be more
helpful in the stabilization of the jurisprudence on Lake Pont-
chartrain and the Louisiana rules of property if the court main-
tained consistency on the classification of this body of water.
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SUCCESSIONS
In Roy 0. Martin Lumber Company v. Strange' suit was in-
stituted under the provisions of R.S. 9:171 et seq.,2 dealing with
the partition of an absentee's property by private sale, seeking
the partition of certain property in which the plaintiff owned a
31/32d interest, and a 1/32d interest being owned by the defend-
ant. The defendant contended that the statutes were not ap-
plicable for the reason that her domicile was well known to the
plaintiff, and that because of her appearance through counsel of
her own choice, having been made counsel of record, she was not
an absentee within the meaning of the statute. The court, on
rehearing, held that the whole tenor of R.S. 9 :171 et seq. clearly
demonstrates that the provisions were only meant to apply to an
absentee whose whereabouts are unknown, who remains un-
known, and who has made no appearance, either in person or by
counsel of record. The court supported its conclusion by refer-
ence to particular provisions of the statute requiring publication
of the notice of the filing of the petition in a newspaper and the
appointment of an attorney at law to "represent the absent, un-
located or deceased owner," stating that the former were intend-
3. See Comment, Seashore in Louisiana, 8 TUL. L. REV. 272 (1934).
*Grateful acknowledgment is hereby registered to my student and friend Dale
Powers for his work in the preparation of these materials.
*#Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
.1. 236 La. 77, 106 So.2d 723 (1958).
2. After institutionof this suit, LA- R.S. 9:171 et seq. (Supp. 1959) were
amended by La. Acts 1956, No. 534.
